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Introduction 
Money in politics is the single largest threat to the democratic system in the United States. 
It influences everything in politics, from the candidates to the issues debated. Every American 
knows that running for office requires large amounts of funding, and being elected requires even 
more. People worry that only the wealthiest voices are being heard; of course, candidates who 
depend on money from wealthy donors for campaign strength would never support unfavorable 
policies for their donors. Clearly, money in politics threatens the core democratic principles upon 
which America was founded. However, few people discuss whether the money really makes a 
difference in elections, and much of the outstanding literature on the impact of campaign funding 
on election results dates back over twenty years. To make things worse, each study uses different 
methodologies, so their results are difficult to compare. Since these studies were published, the 
way that candidates finance their campaigns has completely changed. The Citizens United decision 
in 2010 allowed corporations and political action committees, or PACs, to play a major role in 
campaign funding. Still, funding is a strong predictor of election outcomes; a large amount of funds 
indicates campaign strength for challengers but campaign weakness for incumbents. The impact 
of campaign finance can depend on the source of funding. Incumbents tend to gain most from 
individual donations, while challengers gain the most from PAC donations. Without serious 
consideration of campaign finance reform, money will continue to be the primary source of 
campaign strength and the wealthy will continue to influence elections. 
Literature Review 
Influence of Campaign Funding on Election Outcomes 
Previous literature focused on the relative impacts of incumbents’ and challengers’ 
spending. As a challenger increased her campaign spending, the better she did in elections. Not 
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only did her average vote increase, but the frequency of challenger victories grew (Jacobson, 1978, 
1990, 2006). One possible explanation is that in order to gather voter support, the candidate must 
first become familiar to the voters. Then on Election Day, voters select candidates whom they 
recognize. Spending campaign funds on advertising and other modes of marketing increases the 
probability that a voter will become familiar with a particular campaign and will subsequently 
support that candidate. McBurnett and McBurnett (1994) investigated which subsets of the 
population were more likely to be swayed by campaign spending. They observed that people with 
college degrees, people with an interest in political campaigns, and strong partisans were the least 
likely to be affected.  
Incumbents have a distinct outlook on campaign expenditures because they enjoy what 
Jacobson (1978, 470) termed an “incumbency advantage.” Because they should already be familiar 
to voters, incumbents do not need to spend as much campaign money to become recognized by 
voters (Glantz, Abramowitz, & Burkhart, 1976; Silberman, 1976; Grier, 1989; Jacobson, 1990; 
Abramowitz, 1991). Jacobson (1990) argued that voters will not turn against an incumbent without 
a viable replacement. Therefore, it has been shown that if an incumbent is required to spend large 
sums of money, they are less likely to be reelected -- not because their spending deters voters, but 
because they only spend excessively when a formidable challenger presents herself. In this way, 
incumbent spending is purely reactionary to challenger spending (Jacobson, 1978; Glantz et al., 
1976). Ironically, this spending does little, if anything, to improve election prospects (Caldeira & 
Patterson, 1982; Jacobson, 1990; Levitt, 1994). 
The campaigning period is crucial for challengers, especially, to reach voters with their 
message. Several studies found that as a challenger’s expected vote count rose, their funding also 
rose (Jacobson, 1978, 1985, 2006; Giertz & Sullivan, 1977). After all, contributors are more likely 
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to raise funds for candidates they support. As a candidate garners additional supporters, these 
supporters will raise additional funding for the candidate. Therefore, it is difficult to determine a 
cause and effect relationship between candidate success and funding. In other words, strong 
candidates are able to gain funding, but funding also leads to winning elections. In statistics, this 
problem is called confounding bias, otherwise known as simultaneity bias. Because the 
expectations of election results cannot be modeled perfectly, the effect of challenger spending is 
often overstated while the effect of incumbent spending is understated. 
Previous researchers tackled simultaneity bias in several ways. The first is by eliminating 
the variable for candidate funding altogether. Instead, they used the opponent’s campaign 
expenditures to explain movement in voter support (Giertz & Sullivan, 1977). As a result, they 
were able to remove the influence that a candidate’s spending had on their own voting, thereby 
eradicating simultaneity bias. Other researchers used other functional forms, such as two-stage 
least squares regression, in an attempt to define the cause and effect relationship between the two 
variables (Jacobson, 1985). Grier (1989) denounced simultaneity bias altogether by arguing that if 
campaign contributions are strictly based on expected candidate strength, then losing candidates 
should be known from the beginning of the campaign cycle and will not be able to attract any 
funds at all. However, that is not the case, since many losing candidates in past elections were able 
to adequately finance their campaigns. Due to a lack of standardization between these methods, 
the existing studies on the relative impact of incumbent and challenger spending on election results 
have been inconclusive.  
The results set forth by these past investigations have had major government policy 
implications. First, because challengers are highly dependent on campaign funding to attract votes, 
any government restrictions that limit campaign contributions will favor incumbents. Therefore, it 
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is no surprise that Congressmen do not vote to eliminate spending limit laws (Glantz, Abramowitz, 
& Burkhart 1976; Abramowitz, 1991). The problem is exacerbated by the fact that incumbents 
receive fewer individual contributions than challengers, and that their contributions are smaller in 
size (Grier, 1989). Therefore, incumbents do not face the risk of losing funding if contribution 
limits are enacted.  
The Role of PACs and SuperPACs 
Political action committees, commonly known as PACs, have long played a role in 
campaign finance and election outcomes. These interest groups, who raise and contribute money 
to campaigns of candidates likely to support their ideology, were introduced in 1944. While PACs 
generally represent businesses, labor unions, or ideological interests, the process to create one is 
not restricted to these groups. PACs are currently limited to a $5,000 donation to a single candidate 
per election period, and $15,000 to a national party committee each year (The Center for 
Responsive Politics, n.d.). PACs generally focus their contributions on incumbents (Giertz & 
Sullivan, 1977; Welch, 1980). This suggests that PACs are more interested in gaining political 
favors than influencing elections. In other words, they devote their money to candidates who 
support their platform and have demonstrated an ability to win the election and advocate for their 
ideas. After all, money given to the loser will be wasted, since she will not be able to affect the 
legislature in the PAC’s favor. 
Since these relationships were investigated, several court cases have reformed the world of 
campaign finance. A landmark court decision regarding PACs was delivered by Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission (2010). The Supreme Court ruled that limits on corporate funding 
of independent political broadcasts in elections violate the First Amendment. This case is infamous 
for addressing corporate personhood, in that they hold the same First Amendment rights as 
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citizens. Just months after the Citizens United decision, SpeechNow.Org v. Federal Election 
Commission (2010) asserted that contribution limits on other groups and individuals were 
unconstitutional as well, following the same logic as Citizens United. 
More recent literature has investigated how the Citizens United decision has affected the 
incumbency advantage. Jacobsen (2014) argued that growing party loyalty has diminished this 
advantage in recent years. Fewer people are willing to vote for the opposite party, regardless of 
the incumbency status of the candidates. Therefore, incumbents are increasingly campaigning in 
districts where their challengers’ parties are favored. With more money available to them, 
especially in districts that lean toward their party, challengers are able to respond to the 
incumbents’ campaigns more effectively. 
Citizens United has also had major implications on how campaigns are funded. In the 
aftermath of these court decisions, the Federal Election Commission reported a nearly 470% 
increase in independent expenditures by PACs, groups, and individuals (Bauerly, 2011). 
Specifically, PAC funding doubled between the 2008 and 2010 elections, and accounted for more 
than individuals, corporations, and unions combined. More importantly, the SuperPAC was born. 
These organizations raise unlimited sums of money from businesses, unions, and individuals to 
advocate for or against candidates, but cannot donate directly to the candidate’s campaign. Because 
PACs are not required to disclose the sources of their funding, corporations and the wealthiest 
Americans are able to donate immense funds to support candidates who support favorable policies. 
Thus, the issue of PACs, especially SuperPACs, is hotly debated. However, it has yet to be 
determined whether these expenditures truly help a candidate secure a victory. 
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Methodology
Incumbent Votes Earned 
To analyze the impact of campaign finance on the percentage of votes garnered by the 
incumbent, a multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model was employed:  
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒% = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1  𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑅2010 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑅2012 + 𝛽3 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑅2014
+ 𝛽4 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑅2016 + 𝛽5 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐) + 𝛽6 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑙)
+ 𝛽7 𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑐) + 𝛽8 𝐿𝑛(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝐼𝑛𝑐) + 𝛽9 𝐿𝑛(𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑐)
+ 𝛽10 𝐿𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑐) + 𝛽11 𝐿𝑛(𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑐) + 𝛽12 𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑙)
+ 𝛽13 𝐿𝑛(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑙) + 𝛽14 𝐿𝑛(𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑙)
+ 𝛽15 𝐿𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑙) + 𝛽16 𝐿𝑛(𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑙) + 𝜀 
(1)
The dependent variable, IncVote% is the percentage of the vote earned by the incumbent. 
IncR2010, IncR2012, IncR2014, and IncR2016 are binary variables, which equal 1 if the incumbent 
was a Republican in the given election year, and zero otherwise. These variables capture whether 
a particular party was favored in any of the elections. 
 The next two variables, Ln(TotInc) and Ln(TotChall) measure the log-scaled total funding 
received by the incumbent and challenger, respectively. The incumbent’s share of the vote is 
expected to rise when the incumbent’s spending rises or the challenger’s spending falls. A natural 
logarithm transformation is appropriate because it captures the diminishing marginal utility of 
funding. For example, a $1,000 donation is more valuable to a candidate with a $5,000 campaign 
than a $5 billion campaign. This methodology is common practice among studies involving 
monetary values.  
 The last ten variables categorize the contributions by source. Ln(IndInc) and Ln(IndChall) 
contain the log-scaled contributions from individuals for incumbents and challengers, respectively. 
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Similarly, the log-scaled donations received from PACs is included using the variables 
Ln(CommInc) and Ln(CommChall). The variables Ln(CandInc) and Ln(CandChall) capture the 
candidate’s own contributions to the campaign. Ln(LoanInc) and Ln(LoanChall) reflect the log-
scaled loan values. Lastly, the natural log transformation for all other funding for incumbents and 
challengers is collected as Ln(OtherInc) and Ln(OtherChall).  
Following the notion that increased funding leads to more votes, each of the incumbent’s 
regression coefficients are expected to be positive, and the challenger’s regression coefficients to 
be negative, with one exception: incumbent’s candidate donations. Because a candidate is likely 
to attempt to fundraise from other sources before donating from their own personal funds, the 
incumbent only donates to their own campaign when the race is hotly contested. 
 To mitigate simultaneity bias, a reduced model is estimated, which does not include the 
incumbent’s categorical funding variables: 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒% = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1  𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑅2010 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑅2012 + 𝛽3 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑅2014
+ 𝛽4 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑅2016 + 𝛽5 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐) + 𝛽6 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑙)
+ 𝛽7 𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑙) + 𝛽8 𝐿𝑛(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑙) + 𝛽9 𝐿𝑛(𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑙)
+ 𝛽10 𝐿𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑙) + 𝛽11 𝐿𝑛(𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑙) + 𝜀 
(2)
Margin of Victory 
 Another OLS regression model estimates the effect of campaign funding on the winner’s 
margin of victory. This model takes a similar form as Equation 1, but replaces the incumbent’s 
data with the winner’s (and the challenger’s with the loser’s): 
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𝑀𝑂𝑉 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1  𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑅2010 + 𝛽2 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑅2012 + 𝛽3 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑅2014
+ 𝛽4 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑅2016 + 𝛽5 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑐 + 𝛽6 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑊𝑖𝑛)
+ 𝛽7 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑒) + 𝛽8 𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑊𝑖𝑛) + 𝛽9 𝐿𝑛(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑊𝑖𝑛)
+ 𝛽10 𝐿𝑛(𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑊𝑖𝑛) + 𝛽11 𝐿𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑊𝑖𝑛) + 𝛽12 𝐿𝑛(𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑊𝑖𝑛)
+ 𝛽13 𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑒) + 𝛽14 𝐿𝑛(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑒) + 𝛽15 𝐿𝑛(𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑒)
+ 𝛽16 𝐿𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑒) + 𝛽17 𝐿𝑛(𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑒) + 𝜀 
(3)
Here, the dependent variable, MOV, is the margin of victory, which is calculated as the 
difference in the percentage of the votes earned by the winner and the loser. One additional 
independent variable is included in the study: WinInc, which is a binary variable equal to 1 if the 
winner is the incumbent. Because incumbents enjoy an incumbency advantage, the associated 
regression coefficient is anticipated to be positive. The other regression coefficients in this 
equation are expected to have the same signs as in Equation 1.  
Analogous to Equation 2, the model given in Equation 3 is reduced by removing the 
winner’s categorical funding to mitigate simultaneity bias. This model is as follows: 
𝑀𝑂𝑉 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1  𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑅2010 + 𝛽2𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑅2012 + 𝛽3 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑅2014
+ 𝛽4 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑅2016 + 𝛽5 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑊𝑖𝑛) + 𝛽6 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑒)
+ 𝛽7 𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑒) + 𝛽8 𝐿𝑛(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑒) + 𝛽9 𝐿𝑛(𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑒)
+ 𝛽10 𝐿𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑒) + 𝛽11 𝐿𝑛(𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑒) + 𝜀 
(4) 
Data 
The data used in this study was collected from United States House of Representatives 
elections from 2010 through 2016, which is available through the Federal Election Commission 
(n.d.). All dollars were adjusted for inflation to 2016 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. 
House of Representatives data was chosen because districts are drawn according to population. 
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Therefore, there was no need to adjust for population differences between elections. Because 2010 
was the first election after the Citizens United decision, it serves as the first set of data. Data from 
the 2016 election is the most recent available.  
Several elections were omitted from this study. The data points for open seats and 
uncontested races were discarded because the incumbency-challenger relationship is not present. 
Furthermore, the FEC only requires reporting campaign finance data if $5,000 or more was raised 
or spent by a candidate, though some candidates choose to do so even if this minimum is not met. 
Therefore, only elections in which both the incumbent and the challenger reported campaign 
finances are included in this study. Lastly, due to the small number of third-party candidates, only 
elections between the two major parties (Democrat and Republican) are studied.  
The final dataset includes 1,802 elections over the course of four election years. Summary 
statistics can be found in Table 1. In the data, 86% of incumbents were reelected. The sample was 
skewed towards Republicans, with 56% of them winning their election. Both of these rates 
changed relatively little over the four election years. Surprisingly, the average spending by the 
winner, loser, incumbent, and challenger also varied very little over the election years. It is 
especially important to note that the average PAC spending did not change significantly over the 
four election years. In this way, the Citizens United decision appears to have had little impact on 
the role of PACs in campaign financing. 
The 2012 election’s average spending is unrepresentative of the bulk of the data due to a 
single election. In the state of Washington’s first district, Susan Delbene, a Democratic challenger, 
spent $4.43 billion and won with 54% of the total vote. Because this figure is highly inflated 
compared to the other elections, the average winner spending and average challenger spending are  
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Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Equations 1 and 2 
IncVote% Incumbent’s share of votes 0.6276 0.0905 0.1664 0.9095 
IncR2010 Incumbent was Republican in a 2010 election 0.0989 0.2987 0 1 
IncR2012 Incumbent was Republican in a 2012 election 0.1238 0.3296 0 1 
IncR2014 Incumbent was Republican in a 2014 election 0.1294 0.3358 0 1 
IncR2016 Incumbent was Republican in a 2016 election 0.1506 0.3579 0 1 
Ln(TotInc) Total Incumbent’s Funding ($M) 1.6913 1.4575 0.0089 19.852 
Ln(TotChall) Total Challenger’s Funding ($M) 4.7003 134.66 0.0001 4,430.0 
Ln(IndInc) Incumbent’s Individual Contributions ($M) 0.8659 0.8989 0 14.372 
Ln(CommInc) Incumbent’s PAC Contributions ($M) 0.7341 0.4825 0 3.2797 
Ln(CandInc) Incumbent’s Own Contributions ($M) 0.0063 0.0773 0 2.0770 
Ln(LoanInc) Incumbent’s Loans ($M) 0.0174 0.2527 0 8.0500 
Ln(OtherInc) Incumbent’s Other Funding ($M) 0.0677 0.5322 -2.0002 12.398 
Ln(IndChall) Challenger’s Individual Contributions ($M) 0.4000 0.6614 0 6.2489 
Ln(CommChall) Challenger’s PAC Contributions ($M) 0.0924 0.1887 0 2.2103 
Ln(CandChall) Challenger’s Own Contributions ($M) 0.0347 0.2869 0 4.2550 
Ln(LoanChall) Challenger’s Loans ($M) 0.0736 0.3560 -0.0029 7.9051 
Ln(OtherChall) Challenger’s Other Funding ($M) 4.0997 134.54 -1.1049 4,425.6 
Equations 3 and 4 
MoV Margin of Victory 0.2688 0.1600 0.0015 0.8191 
WinR2010 Winner was Republican in a 2010 election 0.1497 0.3570 0 1 
WinR2012 Winner was Republican in a 2012 election 0.1201 0.3253 0 1 
WinR2014 Winner was Republican in a 2014 election 0.1368 0.3438 0 1 
WinR2016 Winner was Republican in a 2016 election 0.1543 0.3614 0 1 
WinInc Winner was an incumbent 0.8622 0.3448 0 1 
Ln(TotWin) Total Winner’s Funding ($M) 5.6969 134.63 0.0256 4,430.0 
Ln(TotLose) Total Loser’s Funding ($M) 0.5947 1.0358 0.0001 10.873 
Ln(IndWin) Winner’s Individual Contributions ($M) 0.8938 0.9165 0.0225 14.373 
Ln(CommWin) Winner’s PAC Contributions ($M) 0.6999 0.4649 0 3.2797 
Ln(CandWin) Winner’s Own Contributions ($M) 0.0170 0.1927 0 3.6868 
Ln(LoanWin) Winner’s Loans ($M) 0.0288 0.1826 0 3.1626 
Ln(OtherWin) Winner’s Other Funding ($M) 4.1575 134.54 -2.0002 4,425.6 
Ln(IndLose) Loser’s Individual Contributions ($M) 0.3721 0.6146 0 5.0348 
Ln(CommLose) Loser’s PAC Contributions ($M) 0.1265 0.3063 0 2.2843 
Ln(CandLose) Loser’s Own Contributions ($M) 0.0240 0.2270 0 4.2550 
Ln(LoanLose) Loser’s Loans ($M) 0.0622 0.3962 -0.0029 8.0500 
Ln(OtherLose) Loser’s Other Funding ($M) 0.0099 0.0740 -1.1049 19.852 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
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highly skewed right. By removing Delbene’s election from the computation, the averages return 
to values similar to the other three election years, as shown in Table 2. 
  Average Spending By Winner ($) Average Spending By Challenger ($) 
Year N Including Delbene Excluding Delbene Including Delbene Excluding Delbene 
2010 320 1,436,112 1,546,112 699,829 699,829 
2012 227 21,190,353 1,682,346 20,095,784 582,934 
2014 255 1,758,099 1,748,099 530,991 530,991 
2016 280 1,853,555 1,853,555 588,060 588,060 
Table 2: Average Spending by Election Year  
Results 
Prior to examining the regression results, it is important to understand statistical and 
practical significance. Statistical significance is a measure of the meaningfulness or reliability of 
the results. If a statistic is significant at the 10% level, then we are 90% sure that the results are 
not due to chance. Therefore, the smaller the significance level, the stronger the evidence is. 
Practical significance is somewhat different; it examines the magnitude of the result. If a statistic 
is practically insignificant, it means that it has such a small effect that, even if it is statistically 
significant, it is not useful in the real world. Meaningful statistics require both statistical and 
practical significance. For example, if it is determined that campaign loans are strongly correlated 
with the number of votes received, but getting millions of dollars of loans only improves the 
number of votes by 1%, then the relationship is said to have statistical significance and practical 
insignificance. 
Incumbent Votes Earned 
Table 3 presents the coefficients and statistical significance levels for Equation 1 and 2. 
First, the Republican binary variables performed as expected. In 2010, Republicans swept the 
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Equation (1) (2) 
 
  
Intercept 1.18618 1.22154 
IncR2010 0.0254 *** 0.02616 *** 
IncR2012 -0.01102 * -0.01114 * 
IncR2014 0.01874 *** 0.01887 *** 
IncR2016 -0.00602 -0.00639 
Ln(TotInc) -0.01332 ** -0.02370 *** 
Ln(TotChall) -0.01734 *** -0.01753 *** 
Ln(IndChall) -0.00203 -0.00196 
Ln(CommChall) -0.00352 *** -0.00365 *** 
Ln(CandChall) 0.00037367 0.00044032 
Ln(LoanChall) -0.00093493 ** -0.00099487 ** 
Ln(OtherChall) -0.00001507 -0.00011277 
Ln(IndInc) -0.00554  
Ln(CommInc) -0.00232  
Ln(CandInc) -0.00131  
Ln(LoanInc) -0.00093618  
Ln(OtherInc) -0.00087694  
 
  
R2       0.4666 0.4624 
R2adj 0.4586 0.4568 
* Significant at 10% level | ** Significant at 5% level | *** Significant at 1% level  
Table 3: Incumbent Vote Share Regression Results  
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United States House of Representatives elections, winning 63 former Democratic seats (Election 
Map, n.d.). These results suggest that on average, Republicans earned about 2% more votes than 
Democrats, controlling for funding. This finding is highly significant at the 1% level. In 2012, 
Democrats took back 8 seats from Republicans (Election 2012 House Map, n.d.). The negative 
coefficient for IncR2012 supports the election results, and its lower significance reflects the 
smaller discrepancy between Democratic and Republican seats. For the 2014 election, the positive 
and highly significant coefficient for IncR2014 confirms the election results, when Republicans 
won back 12 formerly Democratic seats (Election 2014 House Election Results, 2014). Finally, 
Democrats earned back 6 of their seats from the Republicans in the 2016 election (House Election 
Results: G.O.P. Keeps Control, 2017). Since this election did not radically change the party 
composition in the House of Representatives, the coefficient for IncR2016 is the smallest and least 
significant of the four Republican binary variables. The results put forth by these variables suggests 
that candidates from the more popular party during their election year are more likely to be elected. 
Several conclusions can be reached by comparing Ln(TotInc) and Ln(TotChall). In 
Equation 1, the two have comparable coefficients, suggesting that the funding has the same effect 
for incumbents and challengers, alike. However, because the challenger’s funding is more 
significant, its relationship with the incumbent’s share of the vote is more reliable. Both variables 
are negative; thus, increasing total funding for the incumbent or the challenger lowers the 
percentage of the vote received by the incumbent. When challengers raise more funds, they prove 
themselves to be a more formidable opponent, and are more able to garner votes. On the other 
hand, incumbents only raise funds if a viable opponent who is capable of earning votes emerges. 
Equation 2 offers similar results, except that the incumbent’s funding is more significant, which 
may be because the incumbent’s funding now serves as a proxy for each of the source-specific 
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variables (such as Ln(IndInc), Ln(CommInc), etc.). Thus, raising more money is a good thing for 
the challenger and a bad thing for incumbents.  
The majority of the source-specific coefficients are negative. As a challenger earns more 
funding, she earns more support, and incumbents are required to raise more money. The only 
exception to this rule is the challenger’s own contributions. However, this variable is statistically 
and practically insignificant, meaning that a challenger’s own contributions to her campaign do 
not improve her election prospects. Ln(CommChall) is highly significant at the 1% level and has 
the most negative value, meaning that challengers benefit most from funding from PACs. This 
may result because the challenger must already be strong competition in order to receive PAC 
support.  Although Ln(CommChall) is statistically significant, it has such a small coefficient that 
lacks practical significance. On the other hand, incumbents benefit most from individual donations. 
Perhaps an incumbent’s spending is most effective when it targets voters, specifically, to recall 
their memory of the candidate. However, these results are inconclusive, and do not have enough 
evidence to state with confidence that incumbent’s individual contributions alter the election 
outcome. Therefore, the best way to earn votes is for incumbents to find individual donors, and for 
challengers to find PAC support. 
Equations 1 and 2 satisfy most of the five ordinary least squares assumptions. In particular, 
both equations are linear in parameters. Because these models are not time series models, they do 
not suffer from autocorrelation. Neither model exhibits a variance inflation factor over 10, so no 
evidence for multicollinearity was detected. The residual plots were both slightly concave, 
suggesting that heteroskedasticity might be a problem. However, the coefficients remain unbiased, 
so it is suitable to explain and predict using these models. Finally, the error terms are approximately 
normal. By satisfying many of the model assumptions, the model produces reliable results.  
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 Overall, the two models appear to explain the data reasonably well. Approximately 46% 
of the total variability in the share of votes earned by the incumbent is explained by these variables. 
Their highly significant F-values imply that the coefficients jointly contribute to the 
comprehensive fit of the model. Furthermore, there are no influential observations, as measured 
by Cook’s Distance. Comparing the two models in their entirety is especially valuable in 
determining each model’s effectiveness. Because each has similar coefficients and significances, 
the models are said to be robust. Lastly, because the adjusted R2 does not substantially improve by 
including the incumbent’s source-specific variables, they do not improve the explanatory power 
of the model. None of these variables are statistically significant, and thus do not convincingly 
affect the election results. Because Equation 1 and Equation 2 do not offer different conclusions, 
this study cannot show that simultaneity bias exists. 
Margin of Victory 
Table 4 presents the regression results for Equations 3 and 4. In these models, the 
coefficients for party influence are of predictable sign, but the significance has shifted. These 
results were rather surprising; the Republican advantage in the 2010 elections was expected to be 
to be the most significant, rather than in 2012. Furthermore, because Ln(TotWin) loses significance 
in Equation 3, as compared to Equation 4, it can be said that the total contributions to the winner’s 
campaign do not significantly contribute to their election prospects. Instead, her individual 
donations and loans serve as a stronger predictor.  
Once again, most of the source-specific variable coefficients are negative, meaning that as 
funding rises, the margin of victory declines, regardless of which candidate receives the funding. 
Therefore, candidates are only likely to raise funds if a formidable opponent exists. The result is a 
close race, where the margin of victory is small. According to Equations 3 and 4, there are a few  
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Equation (3) (4) 
   
Intercept 1.11444 1.11983 
WinR2010 0.01927 * 0.01413 
WinR2012 -0.03520 *** -0.03875 ** 
WinR2014 0.01109 0.0088 
WinR2016 -0.02719 ** -0.02983 *** 
WinInc 0.01934 0.03866 *** 
Ln(TotWin) 0.00562 -0.02676 *** 
Ln(TotLose) -0.03498 *** -0.03729 *** 
Ln(IndLose) -0.00149 -0.00147 
Ln(CommLose) -0.00521 *** -0.00532 *** 
Ln(CandLose) 0.00032569 0.00050658 
Ln(LoanLose) -0.00105 -0.00109 
Ln(OtherLose) 0.00052706 0.0032752 
Ln(IndWin) -0.03234 ***  
Ln(CommWin) -0.00042552  
Ln(CandWin) -0.00212  
Ln(LoanWin) -0.00213 *  
Ln(OtherWin) -0.00149  
 
  
R2 0.4636 0.4525 
R2adj 0.4550 0.4464 
* Significant at 10% level | ** Significant at 5% level | *** Significant at 1% level  
Table 4: Margin of Victory Regression Results  
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exceptions to this rule: the loser’s contributions to their own campaign, and other contributions to 
the loser’s campaign. However, both of these coefficients are both practically and statistically 
insignificant; they both show a small coefficient with more than 10% significance. Therefore, this 
study cannot conclude with certainty that either truly affects the margin of victory.  
The unique variable in Equations 3 and 4, WinInc, is positive in both cases, but changes 
significance. Its positive value signifies that incumbents do enjoy an incumbency advantage. In 
fact, the data suggest that incumbents earn a 1.9% margin over their challengers, on average, even 
after controlling for funding. On the other hand, because WinInc loses significance by including 
the source-specific variables, perhaps it is partially explaining the variance in source-specific 
variables instead. This would suggest that incumbents do enjoy an advantage in raising funds, but 
not in garnering votes. 
 We find similar significant variables when comparing Equations 1 and 2 with Equations 3 
and 4. The results suggest that the loser benefits most from PAC contributions. Perhaps this is 
because committee support is difficult to generate, and if a candidate is successful in doing so, a 
close race is bound to occur. For the winners, individual contributions are the most beneficial. 
These results are significant at the 1% level. The only other significant source-specific variable is 
Ln(LoanInc), which is only significant at the 10% level, and has a relatively small impact on the 
margin of victory. More research is needed to investigate whether loans truly benefit campaigns. 
These results provide further evidence that donations from individuals and PACs is the most 
effective for earning votes. 
The results from Equations 3 and 4 are more questionable than that from Equations 1 and 
2, because they fail to satisfy the ordinary least squares assumptions. Although they are still linear 
in parameters and do not exhibit autocorrelation or multicollinearity, their residual plots suggest 
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that heteroskedasticity exists. Not only that, but the error terms are skewed right. Despite these 
issues, the coefficients remain unbiased, though their standard errors are likely incorrect. Thus, the 
results given by Equations 3 and 4 should be taken with caution. 
 As a whole, Equations 3 and 4 are suitable for explaining the differences in margin of 
victory between elections. Each of them captures about 45% of the total variance in margin of 
victory. Not only that, but their highly significant F-values signify that the variables as a whole 
contribute strongly to the model’s fit. Once again, no influential observations were found, as 
measured by Cook’s Distance. This implies that none of the elections impacted the results 
significantly more than the rest. By comparing Equation 3 with 4, this study finds that adding the 
winner’s source-specific funding does not improve the model in any notable way. For the most 
part, coefficient signs and significances are unchanged, and very little is contributed to the R2 
value. These findings cast doubt on the simultaneity bias argument. If simultaneity bias did exist, 
then Equation 3 would have drastically different results than Equation 4. These results are quite 
robust, but not as robust as Equations 1 and 2, so Equations 1 and 2 offer more reliable evidence 
than Equations 3 and 4. 
Conclusion 
 In the end, money does matter; it is a necessary, though admittedly insufficient, source of 
campaign strength. Using ordinary least squares regression, this study investigated how election 
prospects differ by candidate spending and partisanship. Candidates who belong to the more 
popular party during their election year are more likely to be elected. Furthermore, the more 
funding an incumbent receives, the smaller percentage of the vote she receives. The opposite is 
true for challengers. Therefore, the more a candidate spends, the smaller the margin of victory 
becomes, regardless of her incumbency status. This concept differs from the popular belief that 
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funding buys votes. This study adds to the literature by discussing how the impact of campaign 
finance on election outcomes depends on the source of funding. In fact, incumbents benefit most 
from individual contributions, while challengers gain the most from PAC contributions. Earning 
little funding practically guarantees a loss, but earning a lot may not win the election. Therefore, 
campaign finance reform is necessary to restore equality in electoral influence for all Americans, 
regardless of wealth. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Residual Plots 
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Appendix B: Normality Plots 
 
 
  
  
